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Recent Developments 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that 
masters have no authority to order 
an arrest pending review of the 
master's recommendation of 
contempt. State v. Wiegmann, 350 
Md. 585, 714 A.2d 841 (1998). 
The court not only looked at the 
authority of masters in domestic 
cases, but also the continued 
viability of the common-law rule 
permitting individuals illegally 
arrested to resist such an arrest. 
The court declined to abolish this 
common-law rule, holding that 
such an action is better left to the 
legislature. 
On September 21, 1995, Kevin 
Wiegmann appeared at a contempt 
hearing in the Circuit Court for 
Howard County before Master 
Patrick because he failed to pay 
court-ordered child support. At 
the conclusion of the hearing, 
Master Patrick held that 
Wiegmann was in contempt, 
entered a judgment for arrears 
totaling $14,993.65, and sentenced 
him to 45 days in jail, to begin 
immediately. 
When Wiegmann refused to 
cooperate with the deputies who 
were to escort him from the 
courtroom, a struggle ensued. 
After striking one of the deputies 
in the jaw, Wiegmann was 
handcuffed and taken into custody. 
Wiegmann was charged with 
resisting arrest, and assault and 
battery. He was convicted of 
battery, but was acquitted of 
resisting arrest. The Court of 
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Special Appeals of Maryland 
vacated Wiegmann's conviction 
and remanded the case to the 
circuit court, holding that 
Wiegmann's arrest was illegal 
because masters have no implicit 
or express authority to order 
arrests. Certiorari was granted, 
and the issues before the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland were: (1) 
whether a domestic relations 
master had the power to order an 
arrest pending a judicial order; and 
(2) whether the defendant had a 
right to resist an unlawful arrest. 
The court recognized that the 
statutes governing the use of 
masters in domestic relations cases 
and the Maryland rules both limit 
a master's authority. Wiegmann, 
350 Md. at 591, 714 A.2d at 844. 
The court first noted that Maryland 
Rule 9-207(a)(1) authorizes a 
master to preside at a contempt 
hearing regarding "noncompliance 
with an order relating to the 
payment of alimony or child 
support." Id. The question then 
was whether Master Patrick had 
the authority to order an arrest of 
an individual held in contempt. Id. 
By examining Maryland Rule 2-
541 (c), which enumerates the 
powers given to the master for the 
purpose of regulating proceedings 
in the hearing, the court found that 
masters shall only make findings 
of fact and in their advisory 
capacity, provide 
recommendations to the circuit 
court. Id at 592, 714 A.2d at 844. 
Additionally, the rules do not 
expressly allow masters to hold 
litigants against their will. Id 
The State argued that the list of 
masters' powers is not an 
exhaustive list and that the power 
to detain is implicit in Rule 2-
541 ( c) "because such power is 
inherent in the authority conferred 
upon a master to 'regulate all 
proceedings' at a hearing." !d. In 
interpreting the rule and in 
particular the phrase "regulate all 
proceedings," the court looked at 
the purpose, the language, and the 
history of the rule to ascertain its 
meaning. !d. The court noted that 
the interpretation urged by the 
State "would be wholly 
inconsistent with the advisory, 
clerical, and ministerial functions 
that masters have traditionally 
performed," and concluded that the 
rules do not expressly, nor 
implicitly, provide masters with 
the power to detain litigants 
against their will. Id. at 593, 714 
A.2d at 845. 
In examining the role and 
powers of a master, the court 
further analyzed the Mary land 
Constitution and relevant case law. 
ld. The court noted that "a master 
is not a judicial officer" nor is a 
master vested with any judicial 
powers from the state constitution, 
but is regarded merely as an 
advisor to the court. ld. at 593-94, 
714 A.2d at 845 (citing Noli v. 
Noli, 101 Md. App. 243, 646 A.2d 
1021(1994)) (Holding that a 
master "decides nothing, but 
merely reports to the court the 
result of the examination of the 
proceedings"). The court also 
conducted a careful review of the 
minutes from the Court of Appeals 
Standing Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure and found 
that there was a concern about "an 
unconstitutional delegation of 
judicial power to domestic 
masters." ld. at 596, 714 A.2d at 
846. Therefore, the court of 
appeals determined that the state's 
interpretation of the rule was in 
contrast to the history of the rule. 
ld. 
The State argued that in the 
alternative, Wiegmann's arrest was 
"the functional equivalent of an 
arrest warrant" and as such, he had 
no right to resist the arrest. ld. at 
600, 714 A.2d at 848. The court 
dismissed this claim by reiterating 
the fact that a master is not a 
judicial officer and therefore, "has 
no part in the process of issuing 
any 'warrant" nor can a master 
order an arrest. ld. Additionally, 
the subjective good faith belief by 
the deputies that the master had the 
authority to make the arrest is not 
enough. ld. As the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland held, 
"[a] judicially authorized warrant 
is the cornerstone of the Fourth 
Amendment, and analogizing the 
situation in the case sub judice to 
an arrest pursuant to an invalid 
warrant denigrates the importance 
of the warrant to our constitutional 
framework." ld. at 601, 714 A.2d 
at 849 (quoting Wiegmann, 118 
Md. App. 317, 347, 702 A.2d 928, 
943 (1997)). 
The court next considered 
whether it would abolish the 
common-law right to resist an 
illegal warrantless arrest. ld. 
Under the long-standing common-
law rule, "one illegally arrested 
may use any reasonable means to 
effect his escape, even to the 
extent of using such force as is 
reasonably necessary." ld. 
However, the court of appeals has 
recognized a current trend in 
limiting one's right to resist such 
an arrest. ld. at 601-02, 714 A.2d 
at 849. The court has carved out a 
few exceptions to the rule by 
holding that citizens do not have a 
right to resist arrest where they 
were involved in an illegal frisk, 
an unlawful Terry stop, or an arrest 
done under the auspices of a 
facially deficient warrant. [d. at 
602, 714 A.2d at 849. 
Nevertheless, the court concluded 
that changes in ~uch doctrine 
should be left to the will of the 
legislature, thereby upholding the 
right of an individual to resist such 
an arrest. ld. at 604, 714 A.2d at 
850. 
In a strong dissenting opinion, 
Judge Chasanow stated that there 
was no justification for extending 
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this common-law rule permitting 
one to use force to resist arrest, 
especially when the detention is 
ordered by an individual sitting on 
the bench. ld. at 607-08, 714 A.2d 
at 852. Additionally, because 
individuals are allowed to resist 
"arrests which are not based on 
probable cause does not mean we 
should authorize force to resist a 
detention ordered in open court 
after a contempt finding by the ... 
master garbed in a black robe." ld. 
at 609, 714 A.2d at 853. 
The split decisions of both the 
court of special appeals and the 
court of appeals reflects the 
difficulty in deciding whether 
changes in a common-law rule 
should be left to the courts or the 
legislature. The Court of Appeals 
of Maryland held that where the 
common-law rule conflicts with 
modem policy, the will of the 
legislature should govern. ld. at 
605, 714 A.2d at 850. The 
Wiegmann decision states loud and 
clear that Masters do not have the 
authority to arrest defendants and 
reaffirms the common-law rule 
that citizens may use force to resist 
such an arrest. However, Judge 
Chasanow in his dissent raises a 
good point that "[a]uthorizing 
resistance by force in a courtroom 
will serve no public purpose, will 
diminish respect for the courts, and 
will only result in escalating 
violence." ld. at 609, 714 A.2d at 
853. This decision provides 
Marylanders with the belief that 
respect for the courts and the law 
is a belief of the past. 
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